Group Selection as Behavioral Adaptation to Systematic Risk by Zhang, Ruixun et al.
Group Selection as Behavioral Adaptation to Systematic
Risk
Ruixun Zhang1, Thomas J. Brennan2, Andrew W. Lo3,4*
1MIT Department of Mathematics, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America, 2Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, Illinois, United States of
America, 3MIT Sloan School of Management, CSAIL, and EECS, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America, 4AlphaSimplex Group, LLC, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, United States of America
Abstract
Despite many compelling applications in economics, sociobiology, and evolutionary psychology, group selection is still one
of the most hotly contested ideas in evolutionary biology. Here we propose a simple evolutionary model of behavior and
show that what appears to be group selection may, in fact, simply be the consequence of natural selection occurring in
stochastic environments with reproductive risks that are correlated across individuals. Those individuals with highly
correlated risks will appear to form ‘‘groups’’, even if their actions are, in fact, totally autonomous, mindless, and, prior to
selection, uniformly randomly distributed in the population. This framework implies that a separate theory of group
selection is not strictly necessary to explain observed phenomena such as altruism and cooperation. At the same time, it
shows that the notion of group selection does captures a unique aspect of evolution—selection with correlated
reproductive risk–that may be sufficiently widespread to warrant a separate term for the phenomenon.
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Introduction
Since the publication of the path-breaking work of Wynne-
Edwards [1] and Hamilton [2,3] in the 1960s, the theory of
evolution has been applied to much broader contexts than self-
replicating genes. By appealing to notions of inclusive fitness and
kin and group selection, compelling explanations for previously
inexplicable behaviors such as altruism and cooperation have been
developed. This approach has generated a number of additional
insights such as reciprocity [4], the Price equation [5], sociobiology
[6,7], and the theory of multi-level selection [8]. Moreover,
empirical studies have lent further support to the theory of group
and kin selection, including social behavior in bacteria [9–11],
sterility in social insects [3,12], and the avoidance of cannibalism
in salamanders [13].
The behavioral implications of group selection have also
received considerable attention from economists, who have used
evolutionary models to explain apparent conflicts between
individual rationality and human behavior [14,15], including
attitudes toward risk and utility functions [16,17], time preference
[18], and financial markets [19,20]. As an alternative to the
traditional view that ‘‘market prices fully reflect all available
information’’ [21,22], the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis [23]
provides an evolutionary interpretation of financial market
dynamics.
Despite these applications, group selection is still one of the most
hotly contested issues in evolutionary biology. An enormous body
of research has been dedicated to understanding the relationship
between genetic, organismic, and group selection [24–26], and the
relationship between group and kin selection [27–32]. Critics over
the last few decades have argued forcefully against group selection
as a major mechanism of evolution, and recent attempts to revive
it [30,33,34] have been met with swift and broad rebuke [35,36].
Here we propose a reconciliation of the two opposing
perspectives by arguing that what appears to be group selection
may, in fact, simply be the consequence of natural selection
occurring in stochastic environments with reproductive risks that
are correlated across individuals. Those individuals with highly
correlated risks will appear to form ‘‘groups’’, even if their actions
are, in fact, totally autonomous, mindless, and, prior to natural
selection, uniformly randomly distributed in the population.
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We illustrate our approach with the following simple example.
Consider a population of individuals, each facing a binary choice
between one of two possible actions, a and b, and suppose the
environment consists of two possible states of nature, rain or
sunshine, with probability 20% and 80%, respectively. If it rains,
action a leads to 0 offspring for any given individual and action b
leads to 3 offspring; if it shines, the reverse occurs and action a
leads to 3 offspring while action b leads to 0 offspring. From an
individual’s perspective, choosing a will lead to more reproductive
success on average given the higher likelihood of sunshine.
However, if all individuals in the population behaved in this
manner, and rain or sunshine occurred for all individuals at the
same time, the first time that a negative environment appears, the
entire population of individuals that always choose a will become
extinct. If we assume that offspring behave identically to their
parents (perfect transmission of traits across generations), the
behavior ‘‘always choose a’’ cannot survive over time. In fact, we
show below that the behavior with the highest reproductive success
over time in this very specialized example is to randomize between
a and b using the same probability as the probability of sunshine,
80%; the group of individuals exhibiting this probability-matching
behavior achieves the maximum possible growth rate. As a result,
it appears as though selection operates at the group level and that
this group—all individuals i who randomize their actions with
probability pi~80%—is the fittest.
The key to this outcome is the fact that the reproductive risk
facing all individuals in the population, rain or sunshine, is
perfectly correlated, which we refer to as systematic risk. If we had
assumed, instead, that reproductive risk was idiosyncratic–that the
state of nature is independently and identically distributed (IID) for
each individual–then the evolutionarily dominant strategy is, in
fact, the purely ‘‘selfish’’ one in which a is chosen all the time.
This framework demonstrates that a separate theory of group
selection is not strictly necessary to explain observed phenomena
such as altruism and cooperation. But our results also show that
the notion of group selection does capture a unique aspect of
evolution—selection with correlated reproductive risk–that may be
sufficiently widespread and distinct to warrant a separate term for
the phenomenon. There is no controversy around the fact that
selection occurs at the genetic level because of the basic biology of
reproduction. However, we show that selection can also appear to
operate at coarser levels if environmental forces affect a particular
subset of individuals in similar fashion, i.e., if their reproductive
risks are highly correlated. We use the term ‘‘appear’’ intentionally
because in our framework, selection does not occur at the level of
the group, but the behavior that is evolutionarily dominant is
consistent with some of the empirical implications of group
selection.
By studying the impact of selection on behavior rather than on
genes, we are able to derive evolutionary implications that cut
across species, physiology, and genetic origins. In the same way
that different magnifications of a microscope reveal different
details of a specimen, applying evolutionary principles to
behavioral variations leads to different insights that may be more
relevant for economics, psychology, and behavioral ecology.
Because evolution is essentially a passive ‘‘process of elimination’’
[37], selection and adaptation operate at all levels, from genes to
populations, depending on the nature of the corresponding
environmental challenges. Our focus on behavior as the object
of selection is a different lens through which the effects of evolution
may be studied.
In the remainder of this paper, we provide a review of the
literature, followed by an introduction to the binary choice model
with two systematic environmental factors. In this framework, we
derive a behavioral adaptation to stochastic environments with
systematic risk in which groups seem to be the unit of selection, but
which is purely the result of natural selection operating on
individuals in the population. We conclude with a brief discussion
of the results. A generalization of the binary choice model to the
multinomial case with multiple factors is provided in the
Supplementary Information, as well as all proofs and derivations.
Literature Review
The literature on evolution and behavior can be overwhelming,
spanning the disciplines of evolutionary biology, ecology, evolu-
tionary and social psychology, and economics. While a compre-
hensive survey is well beyond the scope of this paper, we attempt
to provide a representative sampling of the many strands that are
most relevant to our focus.
The role of stochastic environments in evolution has been
investigated extensively by biologists and ecologists. Stochastic
environments cause high genetic variation and, in the extreme
cases, extinction [38–44]. Environmental uncertainty that is
associated with stochasticity over time [45–47] or heterogeneity
across space [48] can cause natural selection to favor a gene that
randomizes its phenotypic expression. Gillespie and Guess [49]
describe a heuristic method to study selection in random
environments. Frank [50–52] analyzes how variability in repro-
ductive success affects fitness and relates it to the geometric mean
principle. Geometric-mean fitness has also appeared in the
financial context as the ‘‘Kelly criterion’’ for maximizing the
geometric growth rate of a portfolio [53–56]. However, the
motivation for geometric-mean fitness in population biology is
considerably more compelling than in financial investments
because maximizing the geometric-mean return of a portfolio is
optimal only for individuals with a very specific risk preference,
i.e., those with logarithmic utility functions [54].
In the evolutionary biology literature, Maynard Smith [57] has
developed the concept of an ‘‘evolutionarily stable strategy’’,
specific behaviors that survive over time by conferring reproduc-
tive advantages or ‘‘fitness’’, typically measured by the rate of
population growth. Using this notion of fitness, Fretwell [58],
Cooper and Kaplan [59], and Frank and Slatkin [60] observe that
randomizing behavior can be advantageous in the face of
stochastic environmental conditions. The impact of variability in
reproductive success among individuals in a population has been
shown to yield a kind of risk aversion (which increases average
reproductive success) and ‘‘bet-hedging’’ (which reduces the
variance of reproductive success) [47,61–67]. Frank and Slatkin
[60] propose a framework that highlights the importance of
correlations among individual reproductive success in determining
the path of evolution.
Similar results have been derived in the behavioral ecology
literature, in which the maximization of fitness via dynamic
programming has been shown to yield several observed behaviors,
including risk-sensitive foraging in non-human animal species [68–
79] and seed dispersal strategies in plants [80,81]. Recently, the
neural basis of risk aversion has also received much attention as
researchers discovered that the activity of specific neural substrates
correlates with risk-taking and risk-averse behaviors [82–85].
The relationship between risk-spreading behavior and kin
selection has also been considered. Yoshimura and Clark [86]
show that the risk-spreading polymorphism, in which a given
genotype consists of a mixture of two or more forms each
employing different behavioral strategies [48,59], makes sense only
for groups. Yoshimura and Jansen [87] argue that risk-spreading
adaptation is a form of kin selection [59], and the strategies of kin
can be very important in stochastic environments even if there are
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no interactions at all. Mcnamara [88] introduces the profile of a
strategy and relates the geometric mean fitness to a deterministic
game.
In the economics literature, evolutionary principles were first
introduced to understand cooperation and altruism [89–91], and
evolutionary game theory is considered a foundation for altruistic
behavior [17,92]. Evolutionary models of behavior are especially
important for economists in resolving conflicts between individual
rationality and human behavior [14,18], including attitudes
toward risk and utility functions [16,17,93–95], time preference
[96–100], financial markets and firm selection [19,20,101,102],
and the economic analysis of social institutions [103–105].
Evolutionary models of behavior have also been used to justify
the existence of utility functions and to derive implications for their
functional form [16,95,106] (see Robson [18] and Robson and
Samuelson [99] for comprehensive reviews of this literature). For
example, Robson [16] investigates expected and non-expected
utility behaviors, and finds that randomized behavior may be
optimal from a population perspective even though it is sub-
optimal from an individual perspective [107,108]. Robson [95]
argues that the kind of predictable behavior capable of being
captured by a utility function emerged naturally as an adaptive
mechanism for individuals faced with repeated choices in a
nonstationary environment. Robson and Samuelson [97] find that
exponential discounting in utility functions is consistent with
evolutionarily optimal growth of a population.
Binary Choice Model with Systematic Risk
Consider a population of individuals that live for one period,
produce a random number of offspring asexually, and then die.
During their lives, individuals make only one decision: they choose
from two actions, a and b, and this results in one of two
corresponding random numbers of offspring, xa and xb. Now
suppose that each individual chooses action a with some
probability p[½0,1 and action b with probability 1{p, denoted
by the Bernoulli variable Ip, hence the number of offspring of an
individual is given by the random variable:
xp~Ipxaz(1{I
p)xb,
where
Ip~
1
0
with probability p
with probability 1{p:

We shall henceforth refer to p as the individual’s behavior since
it completely determines how the individual chooses between
action a and b. Note that p can be 0 or 1, hence we are not
requiring individuals to randomize—this will be derived as a
consequence of natural selection under certain conditions.
Now suppose that there are two independent environmental
factors, l1 and l2, that determine reproductive success, and that
xa and xb are both linear combinations of these two factors:
fxa~b1l1z(1{b1)l2xb~b2l1z(1{b2)l2 :
where li§0, 0ƒbiƒ1, i~1,2. Examples of such factors are
weather conditions, the availability of food, or the number of
predators in the environment. Because these factors affect the
fecundity of all individuals in the population, we refer to them as
systematic, and we assume that:
(A1) l1 and l2 are independent random variables with some
well-behaved distribution functions, such that (xa, xb) and
log (pxaz(1{p)xb) have finite moments up to order 2 for all
p[½0,1, b1[½0,1, b2[½0,1, and
(A2) (l1, l2) is IID over time and identical for all individuals in
a given generation.
We shall henceforth refer to (b1, b2) as an individual’s
characteristics. For each action, individuals are faced with a
tradeoff between two positive environmental factors because of
limited resources.
Under this framework, an individual is completely determined
by his behavior p and characteristics (b1, b2). We shall henceforth
refer to f:(p, b1, b2) as an individual’s type. We assume that
offspring behave in a manner identical to their parents, i.e., they
have the same characteristics (b1, b2), and choose between a and
b according to the same p, hence the population may be viewed as
being comprised of different types indexed by the triplet f . In
other words, offspring from a type-f individual are also of the
same type f , hence we are assuming perfect genetic transmission
from one generation to the next (once a type f , always a type f ).
We also assume that the initial population contains an equal
number of all types, which we normalize to be 1 each without loss
of generality. In summary, an individual i of type f~(p, b1, b2)
produces a random number of offspring:
x
p,b1,b2
i ~I
p
i x
b1
a,iz(1{I
p
i )x
b2
b,i ð1Þ
where
f xb1a,i~b1l1z(1{b1)l2xb2b,i~b2l1z(1{b2)l2: ð2Þ
Now consider an initial population of individuals with different
types. Suppose the total number of type f~(p, b1, b2) individuals
in generation T is n
f
T . Under assumptions (A1)–(A2), it is easy to
show that T{1 log n
f
T converges in probability to the log-
geometric-average growth rate:
m(p, b1, b2)~E log px
b1
a z(1{p)x
b2
b
 h i
, ð3Þ
as the number of generations and the number of individuals in
each generation increases without bound (we provide the proof for
a more general case in the Supplementary Information). Define
f a1~pb1z(1{p)b2a2~p(1{b1)z(1{p)(1{b2),
then a1za2~1, and (3) can be equivalently written as
m(p, b1, b2)~E log a1l1z(1{a1)l2ð Þ½ : ð4Þ
We shall henceforth refer to (a1, a2) as the factor loadings of
type-f individuals, and (3) and (4) characterize the log-geometric-
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average growth rate of individuals as a function of their type f in
terms of both behavior p and characteristics (b1, b2).
Over time, individuals with the largest growth rate will
dominate the population geometrically fast [14]. The optimal
factor loading a1 that maximizes (4) is given by:
a1~f 1solution to (6)
0
if E l1=l2½ w1 and E l2=l1½ v1
if E l1=l2½ §1 and E l2=l1½ §1
if E l1=l2½ v1 and E l2=l1½ w1
: ð5Þ
where a1 is defined implicitly in the second case of (5) by
E
l1
a1l1z(1{a

1)l2
 
~E
l2
a1l1z(1{a

1)l2
 
: ð6Þ
As a result, the growth-optimal type is f ~(p, b1, b

2), which is
given explicitly in Table 1.
The optimal characteristics and associated optimal behaviors in
Table 1 show that, when a1 is 1 or 0, one of the factors, l1 or l2, is
significantly more important than the other, and the optimal
strategy places all the weight on the more important factor.
However, when a1 is strictly between 0 and 1, a combination of
factors l1 and l2 is necessary to achieve the maximum growth
rate. Individual characteristics (b1,b

2) need to be distributed in
such a way that one of the two choices of action puts more weight
on one factor, while the other choice puts more weight on the
other factor. Eventually, the behavior p randomizes between the
two choices and therefore achieves the optimal combination of
factors. This is a generalization of the ‘‘adaptive coin-flipping’’
strategies of Cooper and Kaplan [59], who interpret this behavior
as a form of altruism because individuals seem to be acting in the
interest of the population at the expense of their own fitness.
However, Grafen [107] provides a different interpretation by
proposing an alternate measure of fitness, one that reflects the
growth rate of survivors.
This result may be viewed as a primitive form of herding
behavior—where all individuals in the population choose to act in
the same manner—especially if the relative environmental factors,
E½l1=l2 and E½l2=l1, shift suddenly due to rapid environmental
changes. To an outside observer, behaviors among individuals in
this population may seem heterogenous before the shift, but will
become increasingly similar after the shift, creating the appearance
(but not the reality) of intentional coordination, communication,
and synchronization. If the reproductive cycle is sufficiently short,
this change in population-wide behavior may seem highly
responsive to environmental changes, giving the impression that
individuals are learning about their environment. This is indeed a
form of learning, but it occurs at the population level, not at the
individual level, and not within an individual’s lifespan.
Individually Optimal versus Group Optimal Behavior
It is instructive to compare the optimal characteristics and
behavior in Table 1 that maximize growth with the behavior that
maximizes an individual’s reproductive success. According to (1)
and (2), the individually optimal behavior maximizes
E xp,b1,b2
 
~E Ipx
b1
a z(1{I
p)x
b2
b
h i
~a1E½l1za2E½l2
over p, b1, b2. Therefore, the individually optimal factor
loading, denoted by a^1, is simply:
a^1~f 10
arbitrary
if E½l1wE½l2
if E½l1vE½l2
if E½l1~E½l2:
:
Given a particular environment (l1, l2), the individually
optimal behavior depends only on the expectation of two factors,
and this selfish behavior is generally sub-optimal for the group.
In contrast, individuals of type f ~(p, b1, b

2) described in
Table 1 are optimal in the group sense, attaining the maximum
growth rate as a group by behaving differently than the
individually optimal behavior. We shall refer to f  henceforth as
the growth-optimal behavior to underscore the fact that it is
optimal from the population perspective, not necessarily from the
individual’s perspective. This provides a prototype of group
selection as a consequence of stochastic environments with
systematic risk. We define groups to be individuals with the same
characteristics. More precisely, in our model, individuals with the
same (b1, b2) are considered a group. Nature selects the groups
with optimal characteristics (b1, b

2), and p
 is a reflection of
different behaviors for each group.
Table 1. Optimal type f ~(p,b1,b

2) for the binary choice model
Optimal characteristics Optimal behavior
If a1~1 (b1,b2) : b1~1 or b2~1f g
p~f a1{b2b1{b2~1 if b1~1,b2=1a1{b2b1{b2~0
arbitrary
if b1=1,b

2~1
if b1~b

2~1
:
If a1~0 (b1,b2) : b1~0 or b2~0f g
p~
a
1
{b2
b1{b

2
~1 if b1~0,b

2=0
a
1
{b2
b1{b

2
~0
arbitrary
if b1=0,b

2~0
if b1~b

2~0
8>><
>>:
If 0va1v1 (b1,b2) : (b1{a1)(b2{a

1)ƒ0
	 

p~f a1{b2b1{b2 if b1=b2arbitrary if b1~b2 :
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110848.t001
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Like altruism, cooperation, trust, and other behaviors that do
not immediately benefit the individual, the growth-optimal
characteristics and behaviors derived in our framework flourish
because they allow these individuals to pass through the filter of
natural selection. However, unlike theories of group selection that
are based on sexual reproduction and genetic distance, our version
of group selection is based on behavior itself. Those individuals
with types other than f  will not reproduce as quickly, hence from
an evolutionary biologist’s perspective, group selection is operating
at the level of those individuals with characteristics (b1, b

2) and
behaving according to p. Of course, we cannot measure all forms
of characteristics and behavior as readily as we can measure
genetic make-up, but in the stark case of the binary choice model,
it is clear that selection can and does occur according to groups
defined by characteristics and behavior.
The Supplementary Information contains a generalization of
the binary choice model to multinomial choices with multiple
environmental factors. In general, it is possible that the optimal
growth rate m corresponds to multiple groups, and each group
corresponds to multiple optimal behaviors. In terms of group
selection, this fact means that several different groups—each
defined by a specific combination of characteristics—could
simultaneously be optimal from an evolutionary perspective.
Within each group, natural selection will determine the behavior
that achieves the optimal growth rate. The optimal behavior is not
necessarily unique for each group. Also, the optimal behaviors for
different groups might overlap.
A Numerical Example
Consider an island that is isolated from the rest of the world,
and suppose l1 is a measure of weather conditions of the local
environment, and l2 is a measure of the local environment’s
topography where, without loss of generality, we assume that
larger values of each factor are more conducive to reproductive
success. Moreover, l1 and l2 are independent random variables
and described by:
l1~f 1 with probability 122 with probability 1
2
,
l2~f 1 with probability 122 with probability 1
2
:
An individual on this island lives for one period, has one
opportunity to choose one of two actions—farming (action a) or
mining (action b)—which determines its reproductive success, and
then dies immediately after reproduction. The number of offspring
is given by xb1a if action a is chosen and x
b2
b if b is chosen, where
xb1a and x
b2
b are given by:
f xb1a ~b1l1z(1{b1)l2xb2b ~b2l1z(1{b2)l2:
Here, b1 captures an individual’s farming ability as determined
by the two factors, weather and topography; b2 captures an
individual’s mining ability as determined by the same two factors.
According to Table 1, the optimal factor loadings are ..., which
indicates that individuals should have a balanced exposure to both
weather and topography. The optimal characteristics are
(b1, b

2)D(b

1{
1
2
)(b2{
1
2
)ƒ0
 
, ð7Þ
and each group is associated with the optimal behavior:
p~f 12{b2b1{b2 if b1=b2
arbitrary if b1~b

2~
1
2
:
ð8Þ
For example, (b1, b

2)Db

1~
1
2
	 

is an optimal group associated
with p~1. These are individuals who can perfectly balance the
output of farming with respect to weather and topography.
Therefore, they choose farming with probability 1 and appear as a
‘‘group’’ of farmers.
On the other hand, (b1, b

2)Db

2~
1
2
	 

is another optimal group,
but associated with the optimal behavior p~0. These individuals
can perfectly balance the output of mining with respect to weather
and topography. Therefore, they choose mining with probability 1
and appear as a ‘‘group’’ of miners.
Finally, there are also other optimal groups, described by (7) in
general, in which individuals randomize their choices between
farming and mining according to (8), to achieve the optimal
exposure to weather and topography.
Figure 1 shows the optimal behavior for each group. The
optimal groups described by (7) correspond to the upper-left and
lower-right blocks. Randomized behaviors are optimal for these
groups. Interestingly, all the sub-optimal groups (upper-right and
lower-left blocks) correspond to deterministic behaviors (p~0 or
1) except when b1~b2. Figure 2 shows the optimal log-geometric-
average growth rate for each group. It is clear that all groups
described by (7) have the largest growth rate.
We can see that multiple optimal groups co-exist through
natural selection, and within each group, individuals share the
same characteristics. A particular behavior must be paired with a
particular set of characteristics to achieve the optimal growth rate.
Note that the individuals in (7) are optimal only in the group sense.
As a single entity, a group possesses survival benefits above and
beyond an individual, and in our framework, these benefits arise
purely from stochastic environments with systematic risk.
The usual notion of group selection in the evolutionary biology
literature is that natural selection acts at the level of the group
instead of at the more conventional level of the individual, and
interaction among members within each group is much more
frequent than interaction among individuals across groups. In this
case, similar individuals are usually clustered geographically.
However, in our model, individuals do not interact at all,
nevertheless, the fact that individuals with the same behavior
generate offspring with like behavior makes them more likely to
cluster geographically and appear as a ‘‘group’’. In addition,
imagine that the environment (l1, l2) experiences a sudden shift.
To an outside observer, behaviors among individuals in this
population will become increasingly similar after the shift, creating
the appearance—but not the reality—of intentional coordination,
communication, and synchronization.
Here we use the phrase ‘‘appear as a group’’ because our
derived behavior is not strictly the same as group selection as
defined in the evolutionary biology literature. Instead, we show
that behavior which is evolutionarily dominant through the
traditional mechanism of natural selection is consistent with the
Group Selection as Behavioral Adaptation to Systematic Risk
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implications of group selection. We purposefully model individuals
in our population as mindless creatures engaging in random
choices to demonstrate that group-like selection can arise purely
through common factors in reproductive success. If we include
more complex features such as sexual reproduction, limited
resources, and competitive/cooperative interactions among indi-
viduals, even more sophisticated group dynamics can be gener-
ated.
Discussion
Many species have a social structure in which individuals form
groups and the aggregation of individuals promotes the fitness of
group members. When selection for a biological trait in such
populations depends on the difference between groups rather than
individual differences within a group, it is described as ‘‘group
selection’’ in evolutionary biology.
The debate surrounding genetic, kin, and group selection began
over four decades ago, but has recently become more animated
thanks to Nowak et al. [30], who challenge inclusive fitness theory
in the study of social evolution by arguing that it is not a
constructive theory that allows a useful mathematical analysis of
evolutionary processes. Moreover, they conclude that inclusive
fitness is neither useful nor necessary to explain the evolution of
eusociality or other phenomena. However, this view was sharply
criticized by a flurry of responses by many leading evolutionary
biologists [35,109–112], who observe that the more general
inclusive fitness theory has stimulated the extensive empirical
literature over the past 40 years in the fields of behavioral and
evolutionary ecology [35], and that kin selection is a strong,
vibrant theory that forms the basis for our understanding of how
social behavior has evolved [110].
On the other hand, a significant amount of research suggests
that group selection and kin selection (inclusive fitness) are
essentially one process [28, 29, 31, 113–115], both seeking to
characterize the genetic structure of a population but in different
ways. These authors argue that it is now time to step back from the
details of the specific arguments and consider the more general
question of how evolution works in structured populations. This
line of inquiry has the potential to generate insights beyond areas
to which it has traditionally been applied [115].
Instead of entering into this debate, we propose to reconcile
these opposing perspectives by studying the impact of selection on
behavior and deriving evolutionary implications that cut across
species, physiology, and genetic origins. As a direct consequence of
this behavioral approach, we have shown that what appears to be
group selection may, in fact, simply be the consequence of natural
selection occurring in stochastic environments with reproductive
risks that are correlated across individuals. In particular, we
provide an evolutionary model with population dynamics for the
simplest form of behavior, a binary choice, and derive the
implications of selection on the behavior of individuals that share
certain characteristics. Not surprisingly, individuals with similar
characteristics experience similar selective pressures, hence evolu-
tion in stochastic environments with systematic risk can generate
empirical phenomena that are consistent with group selection. In
fact, Nature does select for ‘‘groups’’ of individuals with optimal
characteristics and the optimal behavior within selected groups is
simply a reflection of optimality of the characteristics of that group
with respect to the given environment. Moreover, it is possible that
Figure 1. The optimal behavior for each group in the numerical example of group selection.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110848.g001
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multiple groups achieve the same optimal growth rate but through
different means, i.e., many combinations of behavior and
characteristics can be optimal, leading to considerable variation
in the types of behavior and characteristics in the population.
Hamilton’s great insight was that individual fitness is not
maximized by social evolution; inclusive fitness is [2, 3]. The idea
that something other than the individual organism could be the
fitness-maximizing unit was completely revolutionary at the time
and opened new research areas that are still being explored [111].
We have shown that, in addition to Hamilton’s insight, individuals
with highly correlated risks will appear to form ‘‘groups’’ in
evolution, even if their actions are, in fact, totally autonomous,
mindless, and, prior to natural selection, uniformly randomly
distributed in the population. Although this result seems to
eliminate the need for a separate theory of group selection, the
unique and important evolutionary implications of multiple
sources of correlated systematic risk suggest that a separate term
for this phenomenon may be worthwhile.
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